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Glenn D. Burger 
Poetical Invention and Ethical Wisdom 
in Lindsay's "Testament of Papyngo" 
Lindsay's concern for morality and truthfulness, in an age when politi-
cal and religious institutions were notoriously corrupt, earned him a con-
siderable reputation in his lifetime. Indeed for later generations of Scot-
tish readers, Lindsay's name became a byword for reliability and truthful-
ness, at times even rivalling divine Scripture. Douglas Hamer, in his edi-
tion of The Monarche, recounts "the well-known story of the Scottish 
farmer, who, when on his death-bed, was asked if he would like the Bible 
read to him, to comfort his passing. He replied with some vigor, 'Hout 
awa' wi' your daft nonsense [the Bible!] bring me Davie Lindsay.'''l While 
enthusiasm for The Monarche has since dropped off dramatically, Lindsay 
is still often read too simply in terms of his didactic intent. Murison, for 
1Hamer also notes a telling of the story with a slightly different retort: 'Hoot awa'! 
bring me Davie Lindsay. That [the Bible],s a made story!'" and cites two Scottish proverbs 
showing Lindsay as a standard of truth: "You'll no fmd that in Davie Lindsay," and "It's no 
between the brods o' Davie Lindsay." He goes on to point out that editions of Lindsay's 
Worlcr far outnumber those of any other early Scottish poet. While Lindsay's later popu-
larity rested largely on The Monarche and was confined to the "humble classes," it did last 
well into the eighteenth century. As the frequent references to Lindsay in Scott's novels 
demonstrate, Lindsay was accepted by the people "in two ways, as a standard of religious 
faith and truth and as a standard of poetry" (The Works of Sir David Lindsay of the Mount, 
III, STS, 3rd Series, VI [Edinburgh, 1934],242-5). 
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example, sees Lindsay as a vigorous but straightforward populist writer, 
whose "poetry and drama, overflowing with humour and satire, appealed 
to the eyes, the ears, the feelings of thousands whose minds remained cold 
and irresponsive to sermons and theological disquisitions."2 Certainly 
Lindsay's message was remarkably consistent throughout his career, and 
clearly he meant that message to produce effective reformation of con-
temporary society. However, what is frequently obscured by the emphasis 
on the didactic content of Lindsay's satire is the important role played by 
poetic invention in recovering a truthful ethic for contemporary experi-
ence. While the content of Lindsay's satire remains remarkably consistent 
throughout his life, the literary methods he chooses to embody that mes-
sage are constantly changing. For just as Lindsay's satire seeks to test out 
and recover what is good in inherited religious and political institutions, so 
too does it seek to recuperate traditional rhetoric and poetic invention. 
But the complex relationship that develops between signifier and signified 
in Lindsay's poetry is a recognition of the difficulties involved in imagina-
tively and actively incarnating such wisdom in the present moment. 
A case in point is the early and neglected "Testament of the Papyngo." 
For the most part the poem is either ignored or compared unfavorably in 
terms of subject matter and popular appeal with Lindsay's later morality 
drama, Ane Satire of the Thrie Estaitis. However, the fragmented nature of 
'The Testament of the Papyngo," its structural indeterminacies and tonal 
ambiguities, should rather be understood as a deconstruction of tradi-
tional forms of satire so that they can once again accurately mirror the 
highest truths. Traditional medieval satire sought to remind its audience 
of the essential interconnectedness of signifier and signified, of the Book 
of Nature and Scripture and the mind and will of God. Both human rea-
son and feelings might be invoked when necessary, but only insofar as they 
could serve to bring our fallen understanding in tune with universal truth. 
The activities of the poetaster narrator in 'The Testament," especially his 
emphasis on an eloquence founded entirely on a debased rhetoric and 
personal experience, find a comic exemplification in the subject he 
chooses for his poem. However, a recognition of the initial failings of the 
parrot and his tale-teller also serves to point out the nature of the parrot's 
success at the end of the poem. If by that point this most subjective and 
artificial of situations, through its concentration on the problems of "fefl3it" 
and "unfefl3it," of art and life, does express some truth about the 
contemporary Scottish situation, it is because we are now better able, as 
active participants in the narrative, to create an imaginative experience 
2w. Murison, Sir David Lyndsay: Poet and Satirist of the Old Church in Scotland 
(Cambridge, 1938), pp. 203-4. 
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from which we derive wisdom. The depiction of the parrot as both fallen 
courtier-poet and unique voice for ethical truth forces the poem's readers 
into a new exploration of mimesis, one which acknowledges and incorpo-
rates into its poetic reality the disconnectedness of things, especially the 
disconnectedness of language and ethical behavior in this world. In this 
way the subtext of "The Testament" de constructs and opens up the generi-
cally closed forms of allegory, complaint speculum, and analogizing satire 
in order to admit true reformation, thereby acknowledging the subversive 
power of human language (originating and arising in the subjective will) 
and the difficulty of synthesizing it with that other, higher language 
(arising from the pre-ordinate will of God). 
Our first impression of the Prologue is a deceptively simple one: yet 
another conventionally immodest version of the modesty topos, a display 
of technical virtuosity masquerading as the search for a theme. Typically, 
in the first two stanzas of the Prologue we hear the individual voice strug-
gling unsuccessfully to imitate the achievements of a golden past. We are 
asked to imagine poetical perfection-"Ingyne Angelicall," "sapience more 
than Salamonicall," "I not quhat mater put in memorie" (1-3)3-Only to be 
told that the old poets have already dealt sublimely with that. However, 
from the poet's opening "Suppose," his verbal pyrotechnics push us for-
ward into present poetic efforts and keep our attention focused on this 
poet's technical virtuosity. The enjambement between the last and first 
lines of stanzas one and two, three and four, and the way in which the syn-
tax of each two-stanza unit interlocks for rhetorical ebb and flow, give a 
driving force and vigor to the lists of poets. Indeed, stanzas five and six 
explode in a celebration of the concrete and the individual, as the estab-
lished poetic hierarchy gives way to the present-day scramble of producing 
court poetry. The interlacing of name after name building up to the cli-
max of Ballentyne echoes the very flux of artistic creation. And the unsta-
ble court provides a fitting background for these poets not yet stellified in 
the timeless immortality of the literary pantheon. Nor does the listing of 
"makars' in these stanzas achieve any rhetorical climax suggestive of calm, 
eternal truths. Instead it is the least secure reputation, that of "One cun-
nyng Clerk," who "now, of lait is start vpe, haistelie" (49-50), which ends 
the list. Indeed, Ballentyne's future depends not so much upon his own 
talent but upon events outside himself at court for 
3Douglas Hamer, ed., The Works of Sir David Lindsay of the Mount, I, STS, 3rd Se-
ries, 1(1931),55-90. All quotations from Lindsay's "Testament" are from this edition, with 
line numbers in parentheses in the text. 
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Gett he in to courte auctoritie, 
He wyll precell Quintyng and Kennetie. (53-4) 
Moreover, the Prologue's own attempt at "precellment," far from dupli-
cating the "Ingyne Angelicall" and "sapience more than Salamonicall" of 
the old poets, appears to end in simple verbal and stylistic one-up-man-
ship. Our poet, it seems, can produce nothing more than a tale of a par-
rot, the ultimate, it would seem, in style for its own sake. 
The poet's concentration on verbal ingenuity and the search for a 
theme might be seen as no more than a particularly clear example of the 
limited role assigned to inventio in medieval rhetoric. According to 
Robert O. Payne, 
The theory of knowledge which orthodox Christianity produced placed rigid lim-
its on what man could discover, even through the best exercise of his rational 
faculties .... Post-Augustinian rhetoric assumes on the one hand a constant human 
psychology and on the other a constant supra-human order of value. It is the 
business of the rhetorician-poet to choose from the variety of possible inconstant 
linguistic means the ones which will successfully connect the two. 
Poetry as an art must remain, as long as the framework of medieval belief 
stood, a process of arousing favorable responses to a fittingly dignified statement 
of pre-existing truths ... Thus inventio, if it remains in the discussion at all, be-
comes a process of verbal ingenuity or a search for a theme.4 
But rhetorical invention in the Prologue subverts this prescription to 
portray universal truth. It very clearly leads us away from pre-existing 
truths, from any kind of objective meaning. Instead, this poet's approach 
to art is totally subjective. He writes, he insists, solely from his own expe-
rience, choosing in his tale of a wounded courtier-parrot the most artificial 
of fable-genres. And in stressing the arbitrary and subjective qualities of 
his subject the poet yokes both experience and artifice to his own desire 
for personal "precellment" and stylistic display. The Prologue ends, then, 
apparently caught up in the flux of the present moment, in the telling of a 
story as end in itself. In this way, its "invention" of a parrot-like poetaster 
places any discussion of poetic truth within an entirely fictive framework, 
and thus apparently within the context of an entirely meaningless game. 
In a pinch the poet can declare of his poem: "I maid it bot in mowis, / To 
landwart lassis quhilks kepith kye and 30wis" (71-2). The Prologue thus 
highlights the moral and theoretical inconsistencies inherent in contempo-
rary poetic invention, apparently far removed from the method which, un-
~obert O. Payne, The Key of Remembrance: A Study of Chaucer's Poetics (New 
Haven, Conn., 1963), pp. 44, 46. 
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der Aristotle and Cicero, was used to make the best or most useful deci-
sions about the type of question "about which, because of the nature of 
man and the universe, certainty is impossible or practical application of it 
open to doubt.,,5 The rules of the game here appear to establish the pre-
sent fiction as the ultimate "other" situation. It is supposedly not written 
for our edification but rather as a totally inconsequential tale, far from our 
concerns and situations, whose genesis lies in the personal ambitions of 
the poet. 
Certainly the initial, perhaps strongest, structural movement in the 
Prologue is this forward, downward spiral-from a formal, hierarchical 
golden past to the scrambling, subjective and fluid present. But within the 
deconstructing "game" of the Prologue's rhetoric lies another structure that 
is concerned with the invention of meaningful fiction, one embodying an 
eloquent wisdom that will address the type of question about which 
"certainty is impossible or practical application of it open to doubt." The 
opening two stanzas of the Prologue evoke first those unnamed Latin and 
Greek masters of the high style and then those masters of "our vulgare 
toung" (including not only the expected English triumvirate of Chaucer-
Gower-Lydgate but the Scottish masters Kennedy and Dunbar as well). 
Stanzas three and four address the more recently dead Scots poets, those 
who "Thocht they be ded, thar libells bene leuand" (20), a group domi-
nated by Gavin Douglas. The third grouping contains that explosion of 
names and individuals still living, and therefore not yet established, fellow 
court poets struggling for "precellment." Finally, the Prologue ends with 
the example of the present poet searching vainly for a subject in the bar-
ren soil of an exhausted present and finding only the complaint of a 
wounded parrot. Thus the Prologue's structure at its beginning and end 
emphasizes two contrasting and apparently contradictory images. First is 
the pantheon of long-dead and great poets, whose eternal fame reminds us 
of the presence of some kind of universal truth, a transcendent reality 
transcending our "dull Intellygence" (9). At the opposite extreme are the 
contemporary poets, caught in a present where traditional rhetorical in-
vention seems to exist simply as an opportunity for poetic "precellment" 
and court advancement. Yet at the center of the Prologue, midway be-
tween the unattainable past and the unsatisfactorily vapid present, 
amongst those poets recently dead and not yet stellified, lies the example 
of Gavin Douglas's eloquent wisdom. Unusually, in the Prologue's list of 
"makars," it is the recently dead Gavin Douglas who is given pride of place 
and who receives many of the accolades traditionally reserved for the 
Chaucer-Gower-Lydgate triumvirate: 
5 Payne, p. 44. 
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in our Inglis rethorick, the rose, 
As of Rubeis the Charbunkle bene chose: 
And, as Phebus dois Synthia presell, 
So Gawane Dowglas, Byschope of Dunkell .... (24-7) 
The poet draws attention to Douglas's "prerogatyue" when alive, "Boith in 
pratick and speculatioun" (30), and focuses in particular on his "trew 
Translatioun" (33) of Virgil and his "gret Ingyne, / Als weill in Naturall 
Science as Deuyne" (35-6). The example of Gavin Douglas's truthful elo-
quence is, at this point, a reminder of the existence of a larger, objective 
truth and of a significant, ethical role for the poet's rhetoric in realizing 
that truth in the contemporary world. In this way, perhaps, his presence at 
the center of the Prologue provides the possibility of linking individual 
poetic experience with the universal truth represented by the pantheon of 
dead poets, of imitative invention that goes beyond simple stylistic imita-
tion. 
It would appear, then, that Lindsay has in mind certain parallels be-
tween the poet's interpretation of experience and tradition and the trans-
lator's role as outlined and practiced by Douglas. If so, one must view 
Lindsay's handling of the fictive frame of his poem in light of Douglas's 
strictures about the need for poet/translator both to interpret and to re-
vise a tradition in order to make it comprehensible and worthwhi1e and to 
remain true to its essential nature. Both in Douglas's prefaces to his 
translation of The Aeneid and in the Palice of Honor, the contemporary 
moment and the poetic self composing in it are seen as sites of danger, 
open to failure, ridicule, burlesque, and yet at the same time creative and 
real in their referential power, in their ability to signal a truly national and 
personal style and identity and to be truthful to the unique present situa-
tion. For Douglas, however, this depends upon the creation of a literary 
(and personalized) language and stylistic register that define and create 
themselves by multiple, simultaneous reference (to Chaucer, Virgil, the 
composing self, contemporary Scotland) but which ultimately are not 
trapped in anyone of those references. Douglas creates his own literary 
register by manipulating his target language (Scots) into a competitive po-
sition with his source language (Virgil's Latin). In turn Virgil forms a 
shield against the influence of Chaucer (his other source "language" as a 
Scots poet writing in the vernacular). The result is a mixed style, neither 
popular Scots nor Chaucerian English, a style like Lindsay's in its fusion of 
high seriousness with humor.6 
61 am indebted to Ruth Morse ("Gavin Douglas: Translation as Referral," unpub-
lished paper delivered at the 24th International Congress, The Medieval Institute, Kalama-
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Ultimately Lindsay's rhetorical goal is the innately conservative one of 
the traditional satirist: to recover and re-establish essential truths of ethi-
cal behavior that have been lost or subverted by contemporary society. 
But the Book of Nature cannot be read as simply and as easily as in a 
golden past (as the poet makes clear in his Prologue to "The Testament," 
the stars are very far from the experience of the present poet). Therefore 
it has become all the more important to focus attention on the act of 
translation/recuperation-both that of the poet (with poetic invention as 
prime medium of instruction and improvement) and that of the individual 
reader. The Prologue, then, in its collision of a closed formalist poetic 
with a more open idea of rhetorical process, provides a frame of reference 
for the satire of the poem as a whole. For the rest of the poem exists in 
tension between the need to discover objective truth in the fact of a com-
mon shared experience (the continued reference to serious "matere" out-
side the poem-Scottish history, the necessity for good governance both 
political, personal, and ecclesiastical) and the difficulty of seeing beyond a 
fragmented, subjective, and delusory reality. Because we are forced into 
an awareness of the importance of context, of the way in which intent and 
effect are matched or discrepant, we are forced to make our own transla-
tion of art and experience, as it were, because we cannot be content with 
this poet's, or his parrot's, paraphrases of reality and art. 
The problems encountered by the poet in the Prologue are for the rest 
of the poem proper imaginatively incarnated in the figure of the Papyngo. 
The parrot is a complex referent that collapses into one figure a variety of 
stylistic and symbolic references. In the various rhetorical styles and gen-
res she adopts to tell her story, she enacts the different types of poetic en-
deavor described in the Prologue-the received wisdom of old poets, 
Douglas's attempts to present truth in the contemporary moment, the 
struggle for "precellment" among contemporary poets, even the poetaster 
stylistics of the Prologue's narrator. Symbolically, the parrot's fall can also 
be read in a variety of ways: as a stylistic fall from high style to burlesque 
comedy, as a worldly fall (elaborated in the 0 Forlune! complaints that 
follow), and on a higher level, as a re-enactment of the first Jelix culpa (for 
out of the parrot's mortal error and fall comes the possibility of redeeming 
the body and language in the rest of the poem). Most important, perhaps, 
is the way in which the parrot as signifier remains so open-ended. Initially, 
the parrot, who "of hir Inclynatioun naturall, / ... Countrafaitit all fowlis, 
les and more" (89-90), evokes the idea of simple mimicry, the debasement 
of language to meaningless sounds without symbolic power except in the 
zoo, Michigan, 1989) and David Parkinson (''Aeneid VI, Palice of Honour, and Eneados VI," 
also delivered at Kalamazoo, 1989) for suggesting these uses that Douglas makes of the 
mixed style and translation. 
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most simplistic, "natural" way. But the parrot is also an apt figure of the 
complexities of the courtier/poet's situation. For as "simpyll servetoure" 
(85) to the King she tells people what they want to hear. Yet her language 
"artificall" (87), reminiscent of the "Ornate werkis" (45, 52) and "termes 
aureait" (16) of the poet in the Prologue, clearly has pretensions to the 
high style and its promise of a transcendent, meaningful artifice. Thus im-
plicit in the doomed fall of the overweight parrot whose "kynd" it is to 
climb "aye, to the hycht" (162) is a complex figure of the human situation: 
a ridiculous fat body, heavy and earthbound, yet straining to soar heaven-
ward. 
The overwhelming effect of the poetry between the Prologue and the 
Papyngo's first epistle is bathetic. Whereas the Prologue had demon-
strated a convention adapted by Lindsay and, stylistically at least, vigor-
ously adopted by the poet, the beginning of the Complaint proper is at its 
best mediocre, "high-style" description, and at its worst shown to be radi-
cally at odds with its context. The poet who seven lines previously had 
been complaining of "mater ... So rude / Off sentence, and Rethoricke 
denude" (64-5), opens the present complaint with the crudest possible kind 
of one-to-one moralitas-fable correspondence: 
Quho clymmis to hycht, perforce his feit mon faill; 
Expreme I sal that be Experience, 
Geue that 30W pleis to heir one pietous taill, 
How one fair Bird be faitell violence 
Deuorit was, and myght mak no defence 
Contrare the deth, so fail~it naturail strenth: 
As efter I sail schaw lOw at more lenth. (73-9) 
In using a proverbial sententia to introduce his tale, the poet's implied as-
sumption is that just as a proverb arises out of experiential wisdom, so too 
its use here will describe meaningfully what follows. But in the case of this 
example of an 0 Fortune! proverb it is difficult to tell which comes first, 
"sentence" or "matere," and indeed what relationship really exists between 
the abstract idea of Fortune and Boethian tragedy and this story of a self-
indulgent parrot who falls because he is too fat. Our misgivings arise most 
likely from the easy "Expreme I sal that be Experience." What follows is a 
tissue of conventional responses, no more heart-felt experience it would 
seem than a proverb is necessarily expressive of universal truths. Both can 
be made to say and mean anything, something the poet appears intent on 
in turning a spoilt parrot into a tragic hero. 
But the parrot-like aspects of the poet's eloquence most obviously 
manifest themselves in the background to the Complaint-the landscape, 
the day's astrological genesis, the bird's ascent and fall. This section is as 
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long as the Prologue, and in it the poet employs several highly conven-
tional techniques to set the mood and show his poetic skill. But unlike the 
Prologue's success as illusion, this use of convention reveals an imitative 
mediocrity and a mawkishly "literary" self-consciousness. Lines 104-7, 
while creakily "poetic" in their use of alliteration and aureate diction 
(lfflowris fresche, fragrant, and formose," "c1oudis sabyU ... Beamys 
amyabyll"), do not descend to outright burlesque. But the astrological mo-
tif that takes up three of the six introductory stanzas, and mentions nearly 
every planetary deity in the pantheon, amounts to literary overkill: 
That day did Phebus ... 
That daye Cupido .. . 
Uenus, that daye .. . 
That daye Neptunus ... 
That daye dame Nature ... 
And retrograde wes Mars in Capricorne, 
And Synthia in Sagitter assesit; 
That daye dame Ceres ... 
That daye, be lono ... (122-34). 
Such blatantly mismanaged repetitio strains the reader's credulity as much 
as the forced sententia that opened this section. "Of Rethoryke denude," 
indeed, are such attempts at the high style. Phrases like "So, mycht I saye, 
my schorte solace, aUace" (148) collapse in self-parody when placed beside 
the tradition that they are attempting to echo'? Throughout, these at-
tempts at the literary high style are broken up by the comic intrusions of 
this fiction's reality, its undeniably low context firmly fixed in a material 
existence. Thus portentous statements like 
Wardlie plesour bene so variabyll 
Myxit with sorrow, dreid, and lnconstance, 
That thare in tyll is no contyneuance (145-7) 
raise expectations that cannot possibly be fulfilled (and are not) by the ac-
tion that follows. The reader is made to feel a literary vagrant as he is 
forcibly lifted from one literary c1ich to another: from paradisal garden, to 
portentous astrological description, to proverbial moral, only to end in the 
thoroughly deserved and comically literal faU of a proud and fat parrot. 
These tonal inconsistencies reach a climax in the description of the ac-
tual fall of the parrot. Once free of our gracious narrator the bird "began 
7See, for example, a similar plaint from Chaucer's The Book a/the Duchess (ll. 685-6): 
.... .1 have 10m / My blysse; atlas, that I was born!" 
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to speill, rycht spedalie, / And in that tree scho did so heych ascende" 
(154-5). The narrator's genteel attempts to bring the bird down-
Sweit bird ... Be war, mont nocht over hie; 
Returne in tyme; perchance they feit may faille (157-S) 
-collapse into absurdity with the intrusion of an unwelcome reality: 
''Thov art rycht fat, and nocht weill vsit to fIe" (159). This arbitrariness of 
the narrator in describing the parrot's situation, attempting to tum it into 
something it is not, emphasizes the sententious qualities of the tale. The 
situation as described positively cries out for allegorical "significance" to 
be drawn from it. Statements like "It is my kynd to clym, aye, to the hyght" 
(162) and the interpretation of her fate in terms of a false, fickle Fortune 
(both by the poet and the parrot herself) elaborate the traditional image 
of the parrot as exemplar of the court's slavish and superficial mimicry of 
the whims of the King. But the parrot's grandiloquent claim "It is my kynd 
to clym, aye, to the hyght," is echoed by the poet's mythological tag, "Bot 
Boreas blew one blast ... " (166). And we are reminded of the fact that the 
poet himself subscribes to the very vices that one might traditionally think 
satirized through the courtier-parrot. Both parrot and poet, then, are 
quickly brought down to earth with the rapid series of events culminating 
in her fatal wound. The sheer inconsequentiality of a fat, boastful parrot 
brought to grief by a broken branch undercuts the grandiloquence of the 
parrot's appeal to Nature-"For to complene my fait Infortunate" 
(178)-and the posturings of the narrator attempting to echo Lydgate 
viewing the Black Knight: 
With sory hart, peirst with compassioun, 
And salt tens distellyng frome myne Eine, 
To heir that birdis lamentatioun 
I did aproche, onder ane hauthome grene, 
Quhare I mycht heir and se, and be vnsene.8 
SCf. Lydgate, "A Complaynt of a Loveres Lyfe" (211-7): 
Let hym of routhe ley to audyence 
With delefu1 chere and sobre contenaunce 
To here this man, by fu1 high sentence, 
His mortal wo and his [grete] perturbaunce: 
Compleynyng now lying in a traunce 
With loke[s] vp-cast and [with] rufu1 chere 
Th'effect of which[e] was as ye shal here: 
(John Norton-Smith, ed., John Lydgote ·Poems", Clarendon Medieval and Tudor Se-
ries [Oxford, 1966], p. 53). 
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Within such a context the parrot's lament, "0 fals Fortune, quhy hes 
thov me begylit..." (192), challenges the universal validity of linguistic con-
ventions in describing a situation. One is taken back by this ever-so-
eloquent and rhetorical of laments to the questions about truth raised in 
the Prologue. For only in the most literal and least significant way can 
one claim the beguilement of false Fortune in the case of the parrot. 
Morally, her invocation of Fortune amounts to a kind of double-think, ex-
cusing her from responsibility for a situation that is her own fault. 
Rhetorically, the attempt to glorify the relatively tawdry plight of the par-
rot by recourse to a false fortune topos produces an effect more bathetic 
than pathetic. To broach weighty issues of fortune and free-will, appetite 
and reason, within the present highly ambiguous context of an artificial 
and personally motivated literary intent is to rob them of any absolute 
meaning. The poet's narrative posturings for rhetorical effect, 
Quhydder that I wes strickin in extasie, 
Or throuch one stark Imagynatioun 
Bot it apperit, in myne Fantasie, 
I hard this dolent lamentatioun (220-3), 
indicate a glib expediency approaching cynicism. Such glaringly obvious 
and misapplied borrowings from poetic tradition provoke a radical scepti-
cism about the naive poet and his subject that we carry with us to the 
"unfeIl3it" epistles of the parrot that follow. What began as a totally in-
consequential, delightful situation has by its very inconsequentiality in ap-
proaching language and experience thrown into question our basic as-
sumptions about poetic and experiential truth. 
But this burlesque subjective voice dissolves as the parrot attempts to 
embody conventional wisdom in the familiar tropes of the complaints, 
seeking to become a transparent and true mirror of the past capable of 
translating and transforming a degenerate present. The first complaint, 
the epistle to the King, might be drawn directly from a contemporary 
speculum principis. It is full of good advice-"good" in the sense of having 
the weight of past authority behind it. But its thqroughly conventional 
wisdom, with its advocacy of past "ensamples" for current affairs, is not, 
like the previous use of courtly poetic conventions, undercut by a reduc-
tive comic tone. Indeed it is hard to distinguish the parrot here from a 
multitude of medieval complainers and advisers. The very abstraction and 
conventionality of these epistles, their "parroting" of medieval conventions 
and patterns of thought, has much to say about the effectiveness of com-
plaint-first in describing, and then in reforming, contemporary vices. 
Together, the two epistles develop the idea of speculum in such a way as to 
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fit individual action and responsibility into a universal, objective pattern. 
To the King, 
The Cronecklis to knaw I the exhorte, 
Quhilk may be myrrour to thy Majestie: 
Thare sall thov fund boith gude & euyll reporte 
Off euerilk Prince, efter his qualytie: 
Thocht thay be ded, thare deidis sall nocht dee. 
Traist weill, thov salbe stylit, in that storie, 
As thov deseruis putt in memorie. 
Request that Roye, quhilk rent wes on the rude, 
The to defend frome dedis of defame, 
That no Poyte reporte of the bot gude: 
For princes dayis Induris bot ane drame. (311-20) 
There is, of course, an implicit comparison with his remarks in the Pro-
logue about the universal, eternal quality of "good" poetry, that which is in 
the "memorie." Both manifest an analogizing approach to human action 
and history which reaches its climax in the second epistle. Here the parrot 
attempts her own chronicle, which is to be "Ane Myrrour of those muta-
biliteis: / So may 3e [i.e., the courtiers] knaw the courtis inconstance" 
(522-3). Everything obeys this thematic pattern. Contemporary experi-
ence is abstracted according to the conventions of complaint verse: "sum 
tyrne," "sum in court," 
Fonde fen3eit fulis and flatteraris 
For small seruyce optenith geet rewardis; 
Pandaris, pykthankis, custronis, and clatterar is 
Loupis vp freme laddis, sine Iychtis amang !ardis; 
Blasphematours, beggaris, and canmoun bardis 
Sum tyme in coude hes more auctoritie 
Nor deuote Doctouris in Diuinitie .... (388-94) 
Description by type seems to go hand in hand with typical phrases and im-
ages. Similarly, when the parrot comes to Scottish history, the brief sum-
mary of each reign provides a pithy "ensample" of a high or low moment 
on Fortune's wheel and of the inevitable mutability of her court. Nor is 
this conventional poetry the laughable hackwork of the parrot's introduc-
tory plaint against Fortune. For there is real rhetorical skill in phrases 
like: 
At morne, ane king with sceptour, sweird, and croun; 
Att ewin, ane dede deformit carioun. (484-5) 
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Nor can one deny the abstract truth of these thematic patterns which 
reach their logical conclusion in that "constant court" 
Quhar Christ bene king, quhose tyme interminabyll 
And heych tryumphant glore beis neuer gone. 
That quyet court, myrthfull and ImmutabyU. 
But variance, standith aye ferme and stabyll. 
Dissimilance, flaury, nor fals reporte 
In to that court sall neuer get resorte. (613-8) 
Certainly such an image of perfection is typical of the orthodox medieval 
view and should provide the calm center of universal validity for the pat-
tern of action advocated by the parrot.9 
But these statements come not from a disembodied, objectified tradi-
tion, nor even directly from the poet, but from the mouth of a parrot. 
Even when the poet speaks directly in the Prolgoue, the traditional ways 
for the poet to abstract and universalize are not exploited. "Memorie" is 
beyond this poet; he chooses the parrot's experience. His list of "makars" 
ends not in Christ's court but rather in the very flux of the present-day at 
the court of James V. In the parrot's final epistle there is a similar hec-
toring, overly persuasive quality. She pulls out all the stops: exemplary 
chronicle follows abstract complaint and is in turn followed by a long line 
of ubi sunt examples, ending only with Christ's court and a repetition of 
"Traist well" and the assurance that "this is no fen3eit fare" (619). Yet at 
the same time the jocular "Adieu" of the parrot to Edinburgh, "Snowdon," 
and Falkland (626-46) forcibly reminds us that this is "fen3eit fare." The 
dissonance between the formal correctness of the complaints and their 
context, the sense one has of them as a series of discrete, detachable ele-
ments, would appear to question the effectiveness of the impersonal and 
overly conceptual nature of the complaint form and suggest its potential to 
function as a convenient escape valve that encourages inaction as much as 
action. 
When the parrot re-emerges as embodied voice in the final beast-fa-
ble section of the poem, it is the literal body of the parrot which becomes 
the source of authority. It is now in the figure itself, not the symbolic re-
ality which the figure is intended to embody, that we must search for truth. 
At this point the parrot is invoked as an exotic, eastern bird, embodying 
worldly experience (travel and popular wisdom and experience). Simi-
larly, as an allegorist, whose "story" is one of known history and personal 
experience, the parrot in the final section also draws attention to the 
medium used to embody the message, thereby re-authorizing personal ex-
9Cf., for example, Dunbar's "Lament for the Makaris" (esp.ll. 93-100). 
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perience and phenomenological reality as sites of debate and meaning. 
Finally, when literally silenced, her body dismembered and devoured by 
the voracious carrion birds, the parrot remains an eloquent and speaking 
picture whose true meaning can only be voiced by the reader. The literal 
body of the trope thus bears out, embodies, the "meaning" expounded by 
it, and the audience's role (the role of subjective receptor) is acknowl-
edged, challenged and valorized. In this way the world of experience 
(based on a sensory reality so often dismissed as mere "illusion" in the 
metaphoric translations of traditional satire) can be authorized as the site 
for a truth no longer reliably signalled by traditional institutions. 
The examples of the Pie, Raven, and Kite show how the abstractions 
and transcendental patterns of the two epistles can be twisted to "reason" 
the individual into subjective excesses, how these objective truths when 
handled glibly can mask a merciless, because total, self-absorption. The 
Pie, for example, on meeting the dying Papyngo uses the easy relationship 
between signifier and signified found in the previous epistles in a way that 
now justifies a deceiving and fatal superficiality. "I am a canon regular," 
he declares, "my white rochet signifies my clean life, my black is a memo-
rial of death; therefore, I think you should submit all your goods to my 
care for you now know I am a holy creature" (654-60). Faced with the 
formal, symbolic correctness of the three ecclesiastical birds, the Papyngo 
evades the closure of the traditional semiotic structure by articulating her 
suspicions in terms of subjective, phenomenological experience: 
I did persaue, quhen preuelye 3e did pyke 
Ane chekin frome ane hen, vnder an dyke (678-9) 
and later, 
3 our facunde wordis fair, 
Full sore I dreid, be contrar to lOur de dis. 
The wyffIs of the village cryis, with cair, 
Quhen thai persaue lOur muow ouirthort thar medis (710-13) 
finally concluding, "I heir men saye, 3e bene one Ypocrite" (719). She 
longs for the "nobyll Nychtingall," the "gentyll la," the "Merle," and the 
"Turtur trew" (724-5) to be present. Moreover, at this point the parrot be-
comes herself a story-teller when the Kite asks her to 
Declare to ws soom causis reasonabyll, 
Quhy we bene haldin so abhomynabyll. (743-4) 
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For supposedly the Papyngo is specially endowed to be a satirist: 
Be thy trauell thow hes Experience, 
First beand bred in to the Orient, 
Syne, be thy gude seruyce and delygence 
To Prencis maid heir in the Occident, 
and therefore, 
Thow knawis the vulgare pepyllis lugement. (745-9) 
The parrot agrees that 
All that lyis in my Memoryall 
I sall declare, with trew vnfen3eit hart. (767-8) 
But it turns out that what rests in her memory as a result of long experi-
ence is a history of the Church that we all should know. What separates it 
from the kind of history given in the epistles is the very fact that this his-
tory now seems personally felt and experienced. 
Earlier in the Complaint, the objective story of the Papyngo (her "high 
style" sententiousness) was in radical disjunction with the actual fable be-
ing enacted (the bathetic phenomenon of a fat, overblown parrot). Now, 
objective story (the history of the Church's degeneration) emerges out of 
personal experience, and, moreover, is tested out and proved by the phe-
nomenological experience of the fable context being acted out before us. 
The parrot's personal experience as a result of her travels enacts in words 
the story of ecclesiastical history we all should know; personal story mir-
rors objective history. In turn, the present fable context validates both 
personal and general history, as the parrot is ruthlessly dismembered by 
an avaricious clergy. Moreover, the fact that truth is found in the literal 
figure rather than its allegorical significance (i.e., in the "real" story of a 
bird/parrot) authorizes our own personal stories and interpretations. We 
cannot remain blind to what is happening in the story Ifable. Yet we are 
acutely aware that we are in danger of suffering the Papyngo's fate in our 
lives unless we maintain this multiple perspective on the narrative that is 
our own life story. 
In this way lindsay sets up a mirroring effect by means of which the 
parrot's story gains credence and force from its fable framework. For we 
are affected by the manner of her death. The concentration of the three 
birds on the "game" and its rules means that they have no time to feel its 
consequences in human terms. Their unconscious cruelty has a parallel in 
the cruel 'Japes" of the villains in the Cycle Passion plays. As Kolve has 
pointed out, 
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From the very beginning we can see two kinds of "substitution" shaping the 
action: these men decide in advance that Jesus is a jester, a trickster, an absurd 
imposter, and never properly see Him or hear Him as a result; and they 
constantly substitute games and jokes for the serious religious and legal 
examination that it is their proper duty to conduct. They examine Him, it is true, 
but they turn the examination into a wibty and insulting series of games, with a 
few blows thrown in for good measure.1 
The parrot's felt experiencing of history (to the point of dismember-
ment by the clergy) thus stands clearly distinguished from their kind of 
game. And this vindication of it as a "true" experience creates an impres-
sion of a reality in which "wordes moote be cosyn to the dede,,,l1 a re-cre-
ation in our own experience of that golden age when "Doctryne and deid 
war boith equeuolent" (786). But the presence of a documented, factual 
history, truly "expremed by experience" also acts as a kind of "control ex-
periment" for the fable. Without this impression of objective truth the 
highly affective cannibalism of the parrot would verge on the simply fab-
ulous. If you will, this objective "story" (of the Church's degeneration) re-
places the moralitas's function with regard to the fable. But equally, the 
"game," the affective realism of the fiction, translates this history into 
something unique for us in a way that the conventional complaints of the 
previous two epistles could not. And it is in the fusion of contemporary 
events and fictive reality that the shattering seriousness of this satire de-
velops. 
In the most artificial of images, a parrot, Lindsay's poetic finds a new 
method of exemplar, freer, more suggestive in its "game" than that of tra-
ditional complaint, but nonetheless "actions shaped like game, played as 
though they were game, that can, in fact be serious and reaL,,12 Ulti-
mately, such a notion still derives from the example of Christ: "Where be-
fore there had been only the law, there was now an exemplar of good-
ness.,,13 But with the apparent breakdown of the "notion of analogy" 
(represented in the parrot's epistles), typified in the distrust of the tradi-
tional mediatory institutions of the Church, the new notion of exemplar 
described in this poem must be articulated solely in "this-worldly" terms if 
we are once more to re-create Christ's manifestation in the world of the 
lOV. A. Kolve, The Play Called Corpus Christi (Stanford, 1966), pp. 184-5. 
llChaucer, The Canterbury Tales, GP, I. 742. 
12 Kolve, p. 204. 
13:Kolve, p. 238. 
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"invisible things of God." By denying practical and total efficacy to such 
external, traditional "texts," the subtext of the poem focuses our attention 
always on the individual and on the poetic. Poetic art, because its 
province is the interstices between these two realities, is therefore the 
proper focus for satire. Thus in interpreting the "meaning" of the fable 
(and the poem as a whole) there are no authority figures in the traditional 
sense. Or rather the traditional authorities are exposed as fraudulent (or 
at least potentially as misleading as sensible reality). In the end, authority 
comes from the debased Papyngo (and the reader). Fixing the parrot as 
locus of meaning in the poem keeps the fable from having any fixed center 
of meaning outside the reader's experience of this tale. This forces an in-
dividual, subjective construction of meaning, a translation of this figure in 
terms of the reader's own "memorie." We then enact a further translation 
as that larger poetic experience we have created collides with the "real 
life" we turn back to after the experience of the poem. Paradoxically, 
then, it is only as authority is denied or reduced to a limited and poten-
tially flawed individual experience that traces of it are also found in that 
very fluctuating individual experience. In this way Lindsay constructs an 
ethically active and guiding satire that can evaluate a confusing and 
changing Book of Nature without denying its ultimate connection with the 
pre-ordinate will of God. But this is by de constructing the authority of the 
artist figure and the genres of "high style" poetics in a way that enables us 
to experience anew, to invent with him, and through such analysis of sen-
sory experience and the figural language used to express it, to come to in-
carnate our own eloquent wisdom. 
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